The tension between the right to speak the truth and the obligation not to harm the dignity of others is not an invention of modern law. It has existed for millennia and remains just as relevant today, in the era of social networks and information that circulates instantaneously.
The roots of this conflict can be traced back to Roman law, through the notion of iniuria — any act committed “without right” (sine iure). Over time, this concept evolved beyond physical assaults, eventually protecting what matters most deeply: a person’s reputation (fama) and dignity (dignitas). The Roman legal remedy — actio iniuriarum — did not target material possessions, but rather the “inner self” of the person: their identity and moral integrity.
In the contemporary law of the Republic of Moldova, this concern takes clear shape through Law No. 64 of 23 April 2010 on Freedom of Expression. It is not merely a technical regulation — it is the instrument that maintains an essential balance: on the one hand, the fundamental right to free expression; on the other hand, the protection of honour, dignity, professional reputation, and private life.
Where does freedom of expression end, and where does liability for defamation begin?
This is the central question that courts are called upon to answer — day by day, in real cases with concrete consequences.
In essence, defamation means the dissemination of false information that harms the honour, dignity and/or professional reputation of a person (Article 2 of Law No. 64/2010). In reality, however, beyond the concise wording, we are speaking of a legal mechanism with direct impact on personal and professional life.
The law protects three distinct values of human identity — not as abstract terms, but as concrete elements of each person’s existence (according to Decision No. 7 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Justice of 24 December 2012):
Honour is the social image — the way in which a person is seen and evaluated by others. The invisible business card we carry in every interaction.
Dignity is a deeply personal dimension — the way in which each individual relates to themselves, to their own values, and to their place in society.
Professional reputation is the trust and respect earned within a field of activity. Often essential for career, relationships, and professional opportunities.
Case law consistently emphasises that an attack on reputation or dignity may lead to social or professional marginalisation — sometimes subtle, sometimes severe. And in today’s society, where information circulates rapidly and remains accessible indefinitely, the consequences may be not only immediate but also long-lasting.
Any serious analysis of defamation begins with a seemingly simple question: are we dealing with a fact or with an opinion? This is not a theoretical nuance reserved for jurists — in practice, it is the line that separates legal liability from freedom of expression.
The law is clear: a value judgement is an opinion, comment or idea expressing an attitude towards a fact, the truthfulness of which cannot be proven (Article 2 of Law No. 64/2010). In other words, opinions are not subject to proof in court. To require someone to demonstrate that an opinion is true would amount to limiting freedom of thought at its very source.
However, this freedom is not absolute. Decision No. 2ra-925/18 of the Supreme Court of Justice of 7 November 2018 establishes that any statement, even when it constitutes a value judgement, must be supported by a sufficient factual basis; otherwise, it will be of an excessive nature. When an opinion becomes entirely detached from reality and turns purely speculative or denigrating, it may lose the protection of the law.
Freedom of expression is a fundamental right, but not an absolute one. For this very reason, the law and case law impose a rigorous mechanism of evaluation — derived from Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights — to determine the conditions under which it may be limited.
Courts are required to examine these questions concretely, in relation to each case. Without this filter, any criticism could become risky, and any legal reaction — disproportionate.
The law protects not only reputation, but also the proper functioning of certain essential mechanisms of the State. Article 8 of the Law sets out situations in which certain statements do not give rise to liability for defamation.
Thus, no defamation action may be brought against:
The most debated exception is the one provided in Article 8 letter c) of Law No. 64/2010 — immunity for petitions and complaints submitted to authorities. It is natural that any person should be able to address an institution without fear of being sued. However, this freedom cannot be turned into an instrument of denigration.
The dominant trend in case law is a balanced one. Decision No. 2r-1453/25 of the Court of Appeal Centru of 3 November 2025 ruled that this immunity is relative, not absolute. In other words, it protects only those steps taken in good faith, with the genuine purpose of defending a right. When a complaint contains serious accusations without any factual support, the law no longer offers automatic protection.
This balanced approach is also in line with European case law. In the case of Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Court of Human Rights underlined an essential aspect: even if an accusation is transmitted to a limited number of officials, it may produce real harm. The fact that the authorities have a duty to verify the information does not exonerate the author from responsibility.
Moreover, the Court formulated a principle of legal common sense: the more serious an accusation, the greater the obligation to verify it before formulating it.
In practice, for any person, this framework offers a clear conclusion: you have the right to address the authorities, but not every statement is protected. Good faith and the existence of a minimum factual basis are not merely recommendations — they are essential conditions for benefiting from the protection of the law.
Not all persons benefit from the same level of protection against criticism. Public figures — politicians, officials, opinion leaders — enter, by their own choice, into a space of visibility. Together with this status, they also accept a higher level of exposure to criticism.
In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (the case of Lingens v. Austria) and in national case law (Decision of the Supreme Court of Justice No. 2ra-22/20 of 5 February 2020), a fundamental principle has been established: a politician must demonstrate a higher level of tolerance, including towards harsh or annoying criticism.
Nevertheless, this openness does not mean an absolute lack of protection. Criticism cannot mask unproven factual accusations. And when discourse enters the sphere of concrete statements — accusations of corruption or criminal offences — courts are obliged to verify the existence of a minimum factual basis, regardless of the political or media context.
At the other end of the spectrum stand State institutions: they cannot bring defamation actions. Thus, Article 9 paragraph (2) of Law No. 64/2010 establishes a legislative provision that protects the freedom of public debate in a functional democracy.
The legislator has understood that the press does not merely transmit information — it investigates, criticises, and asks uncomfortable questions. For this reason, Law No. 64/2010 provides an enhanced level of protection for journalism, so as not to inhibit this essential role in democracy.
Article 4 of the Law allows a certain degree of journalistic exaggeration or provocation, as long as the essence of the facts reported is not distorted.
This protection also extends to the form of expression. Journalistic style — whether we speak of serious investigation, critical analysis, or satirical material — is, in principle, protected. Satire, irony, and humour are legitimate instruments of public discourse; however, they lose their protection when they no longer pursue the aim of informing or criticising, but instead become exclusively means of humiliating or denigrating a specific person.
The online space has profoundly changed the way opinions circulate. Social networks are the place of rapid reactions and of formulations more direct than in traditional communication. This is precisely why the legal analysis of digital statements cannot be conducted in the abstract, but only by reference to context: the dynamics of the relationship between the parties, prior tensions, the specific register of online dialogue.
Decision No. 2a-2388/25 of the Court of Appeal Centru of 22 October 2025 sets out an important principle: value judgements, even when formulated in a harsh or offensive manner, cannot be subjected to the test of truth.
At the same time, the court emphasised that the protection of reputation should not be transformed into an instrument for blocking public debate. This aspect is all the more relevant when the targeted person is an active participant in the public space, accustomed to taking part in discussions and openly expressing their positions.
The historical and social context also matters. This aspect becomes particularly important when a person is associated with structures or organisations perceived negatively in society. Such an association is not neutral: it may significantly influence public perception and, consequently, the reputation of the person concerned. For this reason, case law imposes on the author a high standard of caution and verification before formulating such statements. A relevant benchmark is the case of Petrenco v. Moldova, where the European Court of Human Rights underlined that allegations regarding cooperation with the former state security do not constitute mere opinions or value judgements, but factual statements that must be capable of being proven. In other words, the seriousness of such an accusation automatically places it in the sphere of evidence, not interpretation.
The same logic is found in national case law. Decision No. 2ra-1006/16 of the Supreme Court of Justice of 8 June 2016 held that certain historical realities of the Soviet period are notorious and do not require additional proof in the strict sense — such as the control exercised by the party and security organs over access to leadership positions. These elements are considered part of a generally known and accepted historical context.
Professional status — judge, prosecutor, or lawyer — imposes different standards.
With regard to judges, the emphasis falls on the need to protect the authority and impartiality of justice, including through a certain degree of restraint in public communication. Nevertheless, this obligation cannot justify disproportionate sanctions.
In the case of prosecutors, the situation is different. They stand at the intersection between criminal investigation activity and public communication, especially in cases of major public interest. For this reason, they are recognised not only the right but also the obligation to inform the public.
In the case of lawyers, in the exercise of their defence function, they enjoy a certain freedom in formulating arguments before the court. This freedom is not a personal privilege, but a functional guarantee of the right to defence.
In defamation litigation, the success of an action depends not only on the seriousness of the statements, but above all on the parties’ ability to prove them. The law establishes a clear procedural balance between claimant and defendant, precisely in order to avoid both arbitrary sanctioning of expression and excessive protection of unfounded statements.
Pursuant to Article 24 of Law No. 64/2010, the claimant bears the main burden of proof. Specifically, the claimant must demonstrate cumulatively that:
In other words, it is not enough for a statement to be perceived as offensive. It must meet all the legal elements of defamation, and this must be proven by the person invoking the harm to reputation.
On the other side, the defendant is not in a passive position. The law offers several lines of defence, including the possibility of demonstrating that:
This structure reflects an essential principle of modern expression law: not every contested statement automatically becomes unlawful, and the analysis must be carried out in a balanced manner, on the basis of evidence from both sides.
A decisive role is played by the presumptions provided in Article 25 of the Law, which function as a genuine safety net for freedom of expression.
Thus, when there is reasonable doubt as to the status of a person, the doubt is resolved in favour of classifying that person as a public figure. Similarly, if it is unclear whether information concerns a public interest or merely represents idle curiosity, the law imposes the presumption in favour of the existence of a public interest.
As regards the nature of the statement, any uncertainty as to whether we are dealing with a value judgement or with a statement of fact is interpreted in the sense of classifying it as a value judgement, with all the legal consequences that flow from this.
Likewise, if there are doubts as to the existence or extent of moral damage, the law directs the solution towards the recognition of a symbolic damage, set at 1 leu.
In matters of journalistic investigation, any uncertainty as to the good faith of the author is resolved in favour of the presumption of good faith.
Finally, any other doubt that cannot be eliminated according to the rules of evidence is interpreted in favour of freedom of expression, thereby enshrining the principle that the protection of free speech prevails in case of uncertainty.
In matters of defamation, the law does not limit itself to finding an attack on reputation, but provides a set of remedies aimed at restoring the disturbed balance. The injured person may request, depending on the situation, cumulatively or alternatively: retraction of the information, the right of reply, and/or compensation for moral damage. The aim of these measures is not punishment in itself, but the correction of the effects produced in the public space.
An essential procedural element is the prior request. Before bringing the matter before the court, the law requires going through this stage, giving the author of the information the opportunity to react: the author has 5 days to examine the request and 15 days to comply with it.
Only in the case of refusal or disregard of the request may the injured person bring the matter before the court, within 30 days from the date of receipt of the reply or from the date of expiry of the time limit for examining the prior request. This stage is not a formal one but reflects a practical logic: the rapid correction of information is, in many cases, more effective than a lengthy court process.
As regards moral damages, the practice of national courts reveals a tendency towards strict individualisation, depending on the context, impact, and form of communication. Without being exhaustive, the following benchmarks may be observed:
These values are not fixed, but reflect indicative case law, built on the idea of proportionality between the seriousness of the harm and the actual effect on the person.
At European level, the criterion applied by the Court differs from the national one, but complements it: compensation must be reasonably proportionate to the damage suffered, without reaching amounts that could discourage the free exercise of public expression.
Cases in which the Republic of Moldova was a party, or which are relevant for national practice, offer several concrete benchmarks. In a case concerning the defamation of a politician through the press (Flux v. Moldova), the Court awarded compensation of EUR 3,000. In a dispute concerning journalistic freedom (RISE Moldova and Sanduța v. Moldova), the amount granted was EUR 2,300. The situation of a magistrate dismissed from office as a result of public statements (Manole v. Moldova) gave rise to a moral-damage award of EUR 4,500. In cases concerning accusations of cooperation with the former state security (Petrina v. Romania and Petrenco v. Moldova), the compensations ranged between EUR 1,200 and EUR 5,000, depending on the specific circumstances of each case.
Defamation is not merely a legal matter, but a profoundly human one: it arises where the freedom to speak about others meets the natural need to protect our reputation and dignity. In a democratic society, both values matter equally.
The legal framework established by Law No. 64/2010, together with the interpretations given by the courts, shows one essential thing: not every critical statement is unlawful, but neither is freedom of expression unlimited. Everything depends on context, on good faith, and on the balance between what is said and the reality on which those statements are based.
The rule is clear: freedom of expression protects opinions, comments, and criticism made in good faith. It does not, however, protect false factual statements or serious accusations devoid of any foundation — regardless of the form in which they are presented or the channel through which they circulate.
At the same time, if your reputation has been affected, the law offers you real instruments of protection: from retraction and the right of reply to compensation. But these remedies also operate according to clear rules, precisely in order to avoid abuse and to protect freedom of expression.
In the end, the right to expression and the right to reputation are not adversaries, but two sides of the same idea: mutual respect in a free society. The balance between them is not always easy to find, but it is essential.
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